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Who’s Your Debt Collector Now? Extending Debt 
Collection Regulation to First-Party Lenders 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Freedom Stores, also known as Freedom Furniture, is in 
trouble.1 According to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(“CFPB”), the company improperly filed lawsuits to collect consumer 
debt in states in which the consumers neither lived nor signed the loan 
agreement.2 Additionally, Freedom Stores continued to withdraw funds 
from consumer accounts, even though consumers had only authorized a 
one-time withdrawal to make debt payments.3 Freedom Stores, together 
with Freedom Acceptance Corp. and Military Credit Services, agreed to 
refund over $2 million in consumer debt it collected and to pay serious 
fines pursuant to a consent order with the CFPB.4  Freedom Stores is   
not the only first-party lender in trouble. The “buy here pay here”5 car 
seller, DriveTime, recently entered into a consent order with the CFPB 
over abusive debt collection practices.6 The alleged practices included 
harassing phone calls to consumers’ workplaces, which in at least one 
instance led to a consumer being fired.7 DriveTime’s in-house debt 
collectors routinely ignored Do Not Call (“DNC”) requests where 
consumers requested that the collector stop calling them at their 
workplace8  and continued calling and harassing third parties, even after 
 
 
 
1. Mitch Lipka, The CFPB Wins a Battle for Military Members, CBS, (Dec. 18, 2014, 
4:13 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/military-members-to-recover-2-5-million-in-debt- 
collection-settlement/. 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. “Buy here pay here” is a term that describes car dealers that both sell cars and 
service automobile loans. See, e.g., Russ Heaps, What Is Buy Here Pay Here, 
AUTOTRADER.COM (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.autotrader.com/research/article/car- 
shopping/229244/what-is-buy-here-pay-here.jsp. 
6. DriveTime Automotive Grp., Inc. & DT Acceptance Corp., 2014 CFPBCO 0017 
(2014). 
7. Id. at 5. 
8. Id. 
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being told they had reached a wrong number.9 
Despite these questionable practices, the recent interest in 
enforcing regulation against first-party lenders has left many in the 
industry surprised and wary.10 While debt collection by third-party debt 
collectors has been a consistent concern for regulatory agencies,11 debt 
collection by first-party lenders has received far less attention.12 
Following the 2008 financial crisis, however, Congress passed new 
statutes authorizing additional regulation and oversight for financial 
service providers.13 Most notable was the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”), which 
charged the newly-created CFPB with regulating the debt collection 
industry.14 The CFPB does so primarily by creating rules  and 
regulations in accordance with provisions of the Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act (“FDCPA”),15 which sets guidelines for debt collection 
practices of third-party debt collectors.16 Dodd-Frank also includes its 
own regulations for debt collection, including a prohibition on “unfair, 
deceptive, and abusive [acts or] practices,” (“UDAAPs”) by any 
financial service provider.17 
Despite existing protections and changes in regulation, 
significant consumer concerns related to debt collection persist.18 Since 
September 2013, complaints about debt collection exceeded all other 
complaints received by the  CFPB.19     In response  to these  complaints, 
 
9.    Id. at 6–7. 
10. Andy Peters, Banks Fear Crackdown on In-House Debt Collections, AM. BANKER 
CONSUMER FIN. (Dec. 5, 2014), http://www.americanbanker.com/news/consumer- 
finance/banks-fear-crackdown-on-in-house-debt-collections-1071513-1.html. 
11.   S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 2 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1696. 
12. Peters, supra note 10. 
13. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-881, IMPACT OF THE DODD-FRANK 
ACT DEPENDS LARGELY ON FUTURE RULE MAKINGS 1 (Sept. 13, 2012). 
14. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) §§ 
1011, 1012, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5491, 5492(10) (2012) (providing that the CFPB should regulate 
consumer financial products or services). 
15. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 
(1977) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2012)). 
16.    FDCPA §802(e), 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2012). 
17. Dodd Frank § 1031(a)–(d), 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a)–(d). In addition to the FDCPA and 
Dodd-Frank, the Federal Trade Commission Act has been protecting consumers from 
abusive practices in debt collection since 1938. Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed.  
Reg. 67848, 67850 (proposed Nov. 12, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1006). 
18. Debt Collection (Regulation F) 78 Fed. Reg. at 67851. 
19. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, A SNAPSHOT OF DEBT COLLECTION COMPLAINTS 
SUBMITTED  BY OLDER CONSUMERS  3 (2014), available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov 
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the CFPB released an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
(“ANPR”) in October 2013, laying out several areas in the debt 
collection industry that may see additional regulation.20 The ANPR 
primarily seeks regulation of third-party debt collectors.21 Third-party 
debt collectors do not originate loans, but have been the primary focus  
of previous debt collection regulation.22 The CFPB also suggested 
regulation of first-party lenders in debt collection, however, particularly 
with respect to unfair, deceptive, and abusive practices.23 This Note 
argues that, while the CFPB may have the authority to regulate first- 
party lenders, it should not do so in the same way it regulates third-party 
debt collectors. The CFPB should continue regulating through 
enforcement actions or consider a separate rulemaking for first-party 
lenders. 
This Note proceeds in five parts. Part II outlines the primary 
differences between third-party debt collectors and first-party lenders.24 
Part III provides an overview of current regulations of third-party debt 
collectors and first-party lenders, specifically relating to  UDAAPs.25 
Part IV explains the areas in which the ANPR suggests changes in 
regulation, particularly as those changes apply to first-party lenders.26 
Part V discusses whether regulation of first-party lenders is statutorily 
feasible, or even necessary, and addresses some of the practical barriers 
to such regulation.27 Part VI concludes by arguing that, while additional 
regulation of first-party lenders and their debt collection practices is 
possible, the CFPB’s proposed method is not practical because this type 
of regulation requires more individualized consideration.28 
II. FIRST-PARTY LENDERS AND THIRD-PARTY DEBT COLLECTORS 
First-party lenders and third-party debt collectors may appear to 
/reports/a-snapshot-of-debt-collection-complaints-submitted-by-older-consumers/. 
20. See Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. at 67848. 
21. See, e.g., id. (focusing primarily on regulations under the FDCPA, which do not 
extend to first-party lenders). 
22. See Peters, supra note 10. 
23. See Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. at 67870. 
24. See infra Part II. 
25. See infra Part III. 
26. See infra Part IV. 
27. See infra Part V. 
28. See infra Part VI. 
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fulfill similar roles in debt collection, but there are inherent differences 
between the two.29 In the context of debt collection, the basic definition 
of a first-party lender is a lender, like a bank, that originates a loan and 
then collects that same loan itself.30  It may do this through in-house  
debt collection or by contracting with outside collectors, who still  
collect the debt using the name of the original lender.31 DriveTime, a 
company that both sells cars and provides car loans to consumers, is an 
example of a first-party lender.32 DriveTime collects any delinquent 
loans by contracting with debt collectors that attempt to collect the debt 
using DriveTime’s name.33 Bank of America also acts as a first-party 
lender when it attempts to collect on the mortgage loans it issues to its 
mortgagees.34 
Third-party debt collectors, on the other hand, are  debt 
collectors that do not originate loans but rather collect debts issued by 
other institutions using their own name or purchase delinquent accounts 
from first-party lenders,35 often for pennies on the dollar.36 Examples of 
third-party debt collectors are large collection agencies, such as  
Portfolio Recovery Services,37 as well as law firms that specialize in  
debt collection under their own name.38 
First-party lenders and third-party debt collectors are 
significantly different for several reasons.39   First, first-party lenders and 
 
 
 
29. See Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. 67848, 67849 (proposed Nov. 12, 
2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1006) (explaining that third-party debt collectors 
collect debt for an original creditor, but do not issue their own loans or credit). 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. DriveTime Automotive Grp., Inc. & DT Acceptance Corp., 2014 CFPBCO 0017,  
at 4 (2014). 
33.    Id. at 4–5. 
34. See Dena Aubin, Bank of America in Record Settlement over ‘Robocall’ 
Complaints, REUTERS (Sept. 30, 2013), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/30/bankofamerica-robocalls-settle- 
idUSL1N0HQ0HU20130930. 
35. Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. at 67849. 
36. Peter A. Holland, The One Billion Dollar Problem in Small Claims Court: Robo- 
Signing and Lack of Proof in Debt Buyer Cases, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 259, 260 (2011). 
37. Al Lewis, Rein in the Debt-Collection Racket, WALL ST. J. (May 11, 2014), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304885404579550191517738938. 
38. Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. at 67849. 
39. See Comment Letter from Jess Sharp, Managing Dir., U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
to Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau 11–12 (Feb. 28, 2014), available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CFPB-2013-0033-0329. 
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third-party debt collectors are regulated differently.40 The FDCPA 
exempts first-party lenders from regulation,41 but they are often subject 
to a variety of other regulations that do not apply to third-party debt 
collectors.42 Second, first-party lenders have a  different  relationship 
with consumers because they depend on consumers choosing their 
services.43 Meanwhile, third-party debt collectors only make a profit if 
they can collect at least a portion of a delinquent debt and, therefore, use 
aggressive collection tactics more frequently.44 Any new regulatory 
action should take these differences into account. 
 
III. CURRENT REGULATION OF DEBT COLLECTORS AND FIRST-PARTY 
LENDERS 
 
Current regulation already recognizes the differences between 
first-party lenders and third-party debt collectors.45 While the Federal 
Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”) and Dodd-Frank apply to a broader 
category of financial service providers,46 the  FDCPA  applies 
specifically to third-party debt collectors.47 
 
A. FTCA Regulation 
 
The FTCA was enacted before the FDCPA and Dodd-Frank48 
and has historically addressed many consumer concerns related to  
credit, lending, and debt collection.49 In particular, section 5 of the 
FTCA prohibits “using unfair methods of competition in or affecting 
 
 
40. See Comment Letter from Denise Nixon, Int’l Bancshares Corp., to Consumer Fin. 
Prot. Bureau 2 (Feb. 25, 2014), available at http://www.regulations.gov/ 
#!documentDetail;D=CFPB-2013-0033-0229. 
41.   S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 3 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1698. 
42. See Nixon, supra note 40. 
43. See id. at 3. 
44. Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. at 67849. 
45. See, e.g., Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) § 803(6), 15 U.S.C. § 
1692a(6) (specifically excluding first-party lenders from regulation). 
46. See Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) § 5(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012) 
(applying to any party engaged in commerce); see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) § 1002(6), 12 U.S.C. § 5481(6) (2012) (applying to 
any financial service provider). 
47. Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. at 67849. 
48. Kathlyn L. Farrell, Managing UDAAP Compliance Risks in Financial Institutions, 
27 J. TAX’N FIN. INST. 21, 21 (Nov./Dec. 2013). 
49. See Debt Collection (Regulation F) 78 Fed. Reg. at 67851 n.16. 
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commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce.”50 A practice is “unfair” if it “causes or is likely to cause 
substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by 
consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to 
consumers or to competition.”51 The FTCA served as  the  primary 
means of consumer protection from deceptive or unfair debt collection 
from 1938 until Congress passed the FDCPA in 1977.52 Today, the 
FTCA still plays a key role in protecting consumers from deceptive or 
unfair debt collection practices.53 
 
B. FDCPA Regulations 
 
The FDCPA seeks to protect consumers from improper debt 
collection by “eliminate[ing] abusive debt collection practices by debt 
collectors.”54 The FDCPA also aims to prevent those third-party debt 
collectors that do not employ abusive practices from being 
“competitively disadvantaged” because of regulation.55 Congress hoped 
for consistency in state actions by creating some minimal consumer 
protections from abusive debt collection by third-party debt collectors.56 
The FDCPA is limited and excludes first-party lenders from regulation, 
unless they are collecting under a name that is not their own.57 The 
FDCPA specifies a variety of rules and limitations on only third-party 
 
 
50.    FTCA § 5(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2). 
51. FTCA § 5(n), 15 U.S.C. § 45(n). The FTC has since specified that the injury to a 
consumer must be substantial, that it “must not be outweighed by any offsetting consumer  
or competitive benefits” and that the consumer could not have reasonably avoided it. 
International Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1073–74 (1984). 
52. Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. at 67850. 
53. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n,, FTC Takes Action to Stop Phantom 
Debt Scam That Targeted Spanish-Speaking Consumers Nationwide (Oct. 23, 2014), 
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/10/ftc-takes-action-stop-phantom-debt- 
scam-targeted-spanish-speaking (describing an action taken by the FTC against a debt 
collector who was threatening consumers with arrest and “immigration status 
investigation”). 
54. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) § 802, 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2012). 
55. See id. 
56. See id. 
57. See FDCPA § 803(6), 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (listing which parties are considered 
debt collectors, and thus subject to the FDCPA). The Senate report on the FDCPA 
specifically excludes creditors that collect under their “true” name, presumably because it is 
only when the consumer is aware of the first-party lender relationship that the consumer can 
benefit from different relationship with a first-party lender as opposed to a third party debt 
collector. See S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 3 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1698. 
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debt collectors, such as limits on communication with third parties and 
with consumers.58 
An important provision of the FDCPA addresses harassment, 
abuse, false or misleading representation, and unfair practices.59 The 
FDCPA prohibits third-party debt collectors from engaging “in any 
conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse 
any person in connection with the collection of a debt.”60 The FDCPA 
provides some examples of abusive or harassing conduct.61  This 
conduct includes: threatening violence or other types of harm; using 
obscenities in communications; threatening to publish a list of all 
persons who refuse to pay a debt; advertising a debt to force a consumer 
to pay that debt; calling with sufficient frequency to rise to the level of 
harassment; and, except to gather location information, calling without 
providing the debt collectors identity.62 
In addition, third-party debt collectors may not “use any false, 
deceptive, or misleading representations or means in connection with 
the collection of any debt.”63 For instance, third-party debt collectors 
may not impersonate an attorney, pretend to be related to a government 
entity, or misrepresent the “character, amount, or legal status” of a debt 
or a payment on a debt.64 Third-party debt collectors are also prohibited 
from providing consumers with deceptive forms that would lead the 
consumer to believe that a different party was collecting the debt.65 
Further, third-party debt collectors may not “use unfair or 
unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect” a debt.66 For 
example, attempting collection of an amount greater than that expressed 
 
58.    FDCPA § 804, 15 U.S.C. § 1692b. 
59.    FDCPA § 807, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 
60.    FDCPA § 806, 15 U.S.C. § 1692d. 
61.    FDCPA § 806(1)–(6), 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(1)–(6). 
62.   Id. 
63.    FDCPA § 807, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 
64. FDCPA § 807(1)–(5), 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(1)–(5) (providing additional examples of 
deceptive means, such as threatening arrest or imprisonment for nonpayment of debt, 
threatening wage garnishment, or generally threatening debtor with anything that cannot 
legally be done, implicating that a crime has been committed, communicating false 
information related to credit information, making a document that appears to be authorized 
or created by a government entity, failing to use mini-Miranda warning when initially 
communicating with debtor, pretending documents are a legal process, or are not a legal 
process and do not require action when they are, or pretending to be a consumer reporting 
agency). 
65.    FDCPA § 812, 15 U.S.C. § 1692j. 
66.    FDCPA § 808, 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. 
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in the agreement between the debt collector and the consumer is 
considered unfair and unconscionable.67 
Consumers have successfully invoked the FDCPA to protect 
themselves from abusive third-party debt collectors.68 In Crossley v. 
Lieberman,69 a sixty-eight year old widow received a letter informing  
her that legal action would commence against her within a week if she 
did not pay her $297.79 debt.  The third-party debt collector threatened 
a foreclosure action against the widow if she did not pay her debt, even 
though the action would have been barred under the applicable 
Pennsylvania statute.70 When she called the debt collector to tell him  
she could not pay, he advised her to sell her house and become a “bag 
lady.”71 After cashing in her pension to pay her debt, the widow sued  
the debt collector.72 Ultimately, she prevailed by asserting that the debt 
collector could not use deceptive means to collect a  debt,  which 
includes threatening to take barred legal action.73 
Congress “carefully considered” extending the provisions of the 
FDCPA to include first-party lenders when it passed the FDCPA, but 
decided against such an extension.74 Pitner v. Northland Group & 
Capital One Services LLC75 exemplifies the exclusion of first-party 
lenders under the FDCPA. The U.S. District Court for the Western 
District of Washington dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims against Capital 
One, because the plaintiffs failed to establish that the FDCPA applied to 
a first-party lender, such as Capital One.76 Thus, while the FDCPA 
provides extensive consumer protection against third-party debt 
collectors,  consumers  are  dependent  on  Dodd-Frank  for  protection 
 
67.   FDCPA  §  808(1)–(3),  (7),  15  U.S.C.  §  1692f(1)–(3),  (7)  (providing  further 
examples, like depositing checks more than five days after they are dated, unless the debtor 
is informed, encouraging consumers to send postdated checks and using those checks to 
threaten the debtor, or communicating with a  debtor about a debt through a postcard). 
68.    See, e.g., Crossley v. Lieberman, 868 F.2d 566, 570–71 (3d Cir. 1989). 
69.    Id. at 567–68. 
70.    Id. at 570–71. 
71.    Id. at 567–68. 
72.    Id. at 568. 
73.    Id. at 570–71. 
74. See Comment Letter from Virginia O’Neil, Am. Bankers Ass’n, Dong Hong, 
Consumer Bankers Ass’n, and Anne Wallace, Fin. Servs. Roundtable, to Consumer Fin. 
Prot.     Bureau     36     (Feb.     28,     2014),     available     at  http://www.regulations.gov/ 
#!documentDetail;D=CFPB-2013-0033-032. 
75. Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Pitner v. Northland Grp., Inc. & 
Capital One Servs. LLC, 2012 WL 254035, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 26, 2012). 
76. Id. 
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against first-party lenders.77 
 
C. Dodd-Frank Regulation of Debt Collectors and First-Party 
Lenders 
 
Dodd-Frank applies to a broader category of financial service 
providers than does the FDCPA, including first-party lenders.78 Dodd- 
Frank covers any entity that provides a “consumer financial product or 
service” and anyone acting as a service provider to such an entity.79 
Consumer financial services include “extending credit and servicing 
loans” and selling or buying loans, except for the purpose of “extending 
commercial credit to a person who originates consumer credit 
transactions.”80 Also included in the definition of consumer financial 
services is “collecting debt related to any consumer financial product or 
service.”81 Regulation under Dodd-Frank extends to  any  non- 
depository party that the CFPB determines “is engaging, or has  
engaged, in conduct that poses risks to consumers with regard to the 
offering or provision of consumer financial products or services.”82 
Dodd-Frank also requires financial service providers to comply with 
state debt collection laws,83 which may provide greater protection for 
consumers.84 
Dodd-Frank gives the CFPB rulemaking authority to implement 
the consumer protection provisions of the law.85 While making these 
rules, the CFPB is required to consider costs and benefits to consumers 
and to the financial industry.86     In addition to rulemaking, the CFPB 
 
77. See Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. 67848, 67851–52 (proposed Nov. 
12, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1006). 
78.    Id. at 67852. 
79. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) § 
1002(6), 12 U.S.C. § 5481(6) (2012). 
80. Dodd-Frank § 1002(15)(A)(i), 12 U.S.C. § 5481(15)(A)(i) (including several other 
services and products that are not relevant for the purpose here). 
81.   Dodd-Frank § 1002(15)(A)(x), 12 U.S.C. § 5481(15)(A)(x). 
82.    Dodd-Frank § 1024(a)(1)(C), 12 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(1)C). 
83.    Dodd-Frank § 1041, 12 U.S.C. § 5551. 
84. See, e.g., Comment Letter from Alfred Ripley, N.C. Justice Ctr., to Consumer Fin. 
Prot. Bureau 3 (Feb. 28, 2014), available at http://www.regulations.gov/ 
#!documentDetail;D=CFPB-2013-0033-0355 (explaining that North Carolina consumer 
protection law prohibits, for example the collection of a time barred debt). 
85. Dodd-Frank § 1021(c)(5), 12 U.S.C. § 5511(c)(5) (establishing several other 
research and data collection functions). 
86.    Dodd-Frank § 1022(b)(2)(A)(i)–(ii), 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b)(2)(A)(i)–(ii). 
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monitors activities in the financial services industry and actively 
participates in protecting consumers from unexpected risks, especially 
related to new trends.87 The CFPB mandates disclosures and consumer 
access to information so that consumers may understand the “costs, 
benefits, and risks associated with the [financial] product or service.”88 
The CFPB is further tasked with preventing UDAAPs.89 
Dodd-Frank provides some guidance as to what qualifies as a 
UDAAP.90 The Dodd-Frank definition of an “unfair” practice was 
adopted from the FTCA and is nearly identical.91 Dodd-Frank does not 
further define “deceptive” practices, instead, its meaning has been 
developed through agency enforcement actions  and  publications.92  
Both deceptive and unfair practice prohibitions appear in the FTCA and 
have been defined in that context through the judicial process and 
enforcement actions.93    The CFPB relies on those actions to inform its 
 
 
87. Dodd-Frank § 1022(c)(1), 12 U.S.C.  §  5512(c)(1).  For example,  the CFPB has 
been monitoring the changes in debt collection practices with the rise of new technologies. 
Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. 67848, 67853 (proposed Nov. 12, 2013) (to be 
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1006). 
88.    Dodd-Frank § 1032(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5532(a). 
89. Dodd-Frank § 1031(a)–(d), 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a)–(d). Additionally, financial service 
providers are prohibited from providing illegal services. Dodd-Frank § 1036(a)(1)(A), 12 
U.S.C. § 5536(a)(1)(A). 
90. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank § 1031(c)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c)(1) (providing guidance on 
“unfair” practices). 
91. Dodd-Frank § 1031(c)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c)(1) (stating that a practice is unfair if 
“the act or practice causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not 
reasonably avoidable by consumers; and . . . such substantial injury is not outweighed by 
countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition”); Federal Trade Commission Act 
(“FTCA”) § 5(n), 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012) (stating that a practice is “unfair” if it “causes or 
is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by 
consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to 
competition”). 
92. See, e.g., CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB BULL. No. 2013-07, PROHIBITION 
OF UNFAIR, DECEPTIVE, OR ABUSIVE ACTS OR PRACTICES IN THE COLLECTION OF CONSUMER 
DEBTS 3–4 (2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201307_cfpb_bulletin_unfair- 
deceptive-abusive-practices.pdf [hereinafter BULLETIN]. The CFPB has, however, defined 
deceptive conduct in its examination manual, stating that practices are deceptive if “(1) The 
representation, omission, act, or practice misleads or is likely to mislead the consumer; 
(2) The consumer’s interpretation of the representation, omission, act, or practice is 
reasonable under the circumstances; and (3) The misleading representation, omission, act, or 
practice   is   material.” CONSUMER    FIN.   PROT.   BUREAU,   CFPB   SUPERVISION   AND 
EXAMINATION MANUAL V.2, STATUTORY-AND REGULATION-BASED PROCEDURE, UNFAIR, 
DECEPTIVE, OR ABUSIVE ACTS OR PRACTICES 5 (Oct. 2012), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201210_cfpb_supervision-and-examination-manual- 
v2.pdf [hereinafter MANUAL]. 
93. See Farrell, supra note 48, at 21–22. 
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understanding of unfair and deceptive practices.94 “Abusive” practices, 
however, represent a new concept introduced by Dodd-Frank.95 A 
practice qualifies as abusive if it “materially interferes with the ability  
of a consumer to understand a term or condition of a consumer financial 
product or service” or if it “takes unreasonable advantage” of “lack of 
understanding . . . the inability of the consumer to protect the interest of 
the consumer [and] . . . the reasonable reliance by consumer on covered 
person to act in the interest of the consumer.”96 Because “abusive 
practice” prohibitions are relatively new, comprehensive interpretations 
of the term remain limited.97 
IV. AREAS OF PROPOSED REGULATION 
 
Consumers and consumer advocacy groups have concerns about 
the current state of non-compliance of many third-party debt collectors 
and first-party lenders.98 While  the most  frequent consumer complaint 
is abusive communication,99 consumers also express concern over 
misrepresentation about the amount of debt they owe and the legal  
status of such debt.100 In light of technological advances, both 
consumers and debt collectors are left without guidance about what is 
considered abusive, unfair or deceptive.101 
In its ANPR on debt collection, the CFPB proposes regulation 
 
94. See, e.g., BULLETIN, supra note 89, at 2 n.8; see also MANUAL, supra note 92, at 1 
n.2. 
95. Farrell, supra note 48, at 28. 
96.    Dodd-Frank § 1031(d), 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d). 
97. See Farrell, supra note 48, at 28. In a recent enforcement action, the CFPB found 
that creating a false sense of urgency in attempting to collect a debt which led consumers to 
borrow more money from a payday lender was abusive, since it took unreasonable  
advantage of the consumers’ inability to protect their own interest. ACE Cash Express, Inc., 
2014 CFPBCO 0008, at 10–11 (2014). 
98. See, e.g., CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB ORDERS SUBPRIME CREDIT CARD 
COMPANY TO REFUND $2.7 MILLION FOR CHARGING ILLEGAL CREDIT CARD FEES (Feb. 4, 
2015), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-orders-subprime-credit-card- 
company-to-refund-2-7-million-for-charging-illegal-credit-card-fees/ (explaining that the 
CFPB ordered a subprime credit card company to refund money to consumers for illegal 
credit card charges). 
99. Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. 67848, 67863 (proposed Nov. 12, 
2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1006) (stating that abusive communications include 
“multiple calls from debt collector in a pattern that seemed to them to be harassment”). 
100. Lewis, supra note 37. 
101. See Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. at 67870–72 (stating that more 
rules could provide more clarity, and describing some of the concerns that arise with the use 
of new technology). 
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that touches upon a variety of different aspects of debt collection, 
including information disclosures upon the sale or transfer of a debt, 
validation notices and debt disputes, communications with consumers 
and third parties, abusive, deceptive and unfair practices, litigation 
practices, and time-barred debt.102 Through new rules, CFPB may also 
provide a clearer definition of service providers and service provider 
liability.103 Significantly, the CFPB explicitly mentions regulation of 
unfair, deceptive, and abusive practices by first-party lenders.104 This is 
particularly surprising due to the previous dearth regarding regulation of 
first-party lenders and their debt collection practices.105 The CFPB’s 
suggestion of first-party regulation surprised many first-party lenders 
because the UDAAP provisions of Dodd-Frank were typically defined 
by enforcement actions or in reliance on the FTCA and because the 
CFPB gave no indication that it was planning to regulate this area of 
debt collection.106 Still, the CFPB may now implement more specific 
regulatory definitions for first-party lenders that are similar, or identical, 
to those for third-party debt collectors under the FDCPA.107 
 
A. Unfair, Deceptive, and Abusive Practices 
 
The CFPB is considering more detailed standards relating to 
unfair, deceptive, and abusive debt collection to make compliance easier 
for any party collecting a debt.108 In doing so, the CFPB may prohibit 
first-party lenders from engaging in practices that, until now, were only 
prohibited for third-party debt collectors under the FDCPA.109  The 
CFPB could accomplish this by finding that practices that are abusive 
and prohibited under the FDCPA are also prohibited by Dodd-Frank’s 
 
102.    Id. at 67848. 
103.    Id. at 67874–75. 
104.    See id. at 67870–73. 
105. See Peters, supra note 10, at 2. 
106. See Farrell, supra note 48, at 28 (stating that “no one can be sure” how the abusive 
acts definition will be shaped by the CFPB). 
107. Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. at 67870–74 (questioning, for 
example, whether the CFPB should “include in proposed rules prohibitions on first-party 
debt collectors engaging in the same conduct that such rules would bar as unfair or 
unconscionable by third-party debt collectors”). 
108.    Id. at 67870. 
109. See id. (questioning, for example, whether the CFPB should “include in proposed 
rules prohibitions on first-party debt collectors engaging in the same conduct that such rules 
would bar as abusive conduct by third-party debt collectors”). 
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UDAAP   provisions.110 This    symmetry    would  create   uniform 
expectations and prohibitions related to abusive practices for any party 
attempting to collect a debt, including first-party lenders.111 For  
example, loan agreements for service members often include permission 
for a first-party lender to contact the commanding officer of the 
consumer about the loan.112 The FDCPA limits the way in which third- 
party debt collectors communicate with commanding officers.113 
However, less clarity remains if the collector of the debt is a first-party 
lender, since little guidance exists on how the CFPB will apply the 
provisions of abusive practices under Dodd-Frank.114 While  more  
clarity would be beneficial here, it could also be achieved through 
individual enforcement actions instead of through broad regulation. 
In the ANPR, the CFPB also addresses possible regulation of 
deceptive conduct related to first-party lenders.115 First-party lenders 
could benefit from a clearer definition of deceptive practices, since they 
would have more guidance for their own conduct.116 The current 
definition of deceptive practices is based on the FTCA definition of the 
term, which has been shaped by years of enforcement actions.117 The 
CFPB could expedite addressing deceptive conduct by creating a 
uniform and expanded definition, particularly as it arises in the use of 
new technology—including novel communication media such as email 
or social media—which has implications for the mini-Miranda 
requirement,118    electronic  payment  methods,  and  fee   disclosures.119 
 
110. Id. 
111. See id. (“Greater clarity and specificity as to prohibited conduct could make it 
easier for collectors and others to know what they must do to comply with the law. Rules 
that provide greater clarity and specificity as to prohibited conduct also could simplify law 
enforcement actions against those who do not comply.”) 
112.    Id. at 67866. 
113. Id. (finding that such communications will be limited under the FDCPA if they are 
“inconvenient, annoying, or harassing, or may harm their reputations at work”). 
114. See Farrell, supra note 48, at 28. 
115. Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. at 67871. 
116. See id. at 67870. 
117. Farrell, supra note 48, at 21. 
118. The Mini-Miranda warning is the requirement that debt collectors disclose that they 
are debt collectors or that they are attempting to collect a debt when they communicate with 
consumers. TRACY A. KENNEDY, ZIMNEY FOSTER P.C., FEDERAL FAIR DEBT COLLECTION 
PRACTICES ACT—FEDERAL LAW GOVERNING THE CONDUCT OF THIRD PARTY DEBT 
COLLECTORS (COLLECTION AGENCIES AND LAWYERS) WHO COLLECT “CONSUMER” DEBTS 
FOR CREDITORS,        http://www.sband.org/userfiles/files/pdfs/seminar_pdfs/materials/ 
materials_kennedy_collectionpracticeact.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2014). 
119. See  Debt  Collection  (Regulation  F), 78  Fed. Reg.  at  67872–73  (discussing, for 
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Such improvements could prevent, for example, mini-Miranda warning 
violations, which occur when a party attempting to collect a debt 
“friends” a consumer on social media sites, without disclosing who they 
are or what they are doing.120 However, additional regulation of 
communications could make it more difficult for first-party lenders to 
communicate with consumers.121 While third-party debt collectors 
contact consumers solely for the purpose of collecting a debt and have 
no incentive to refrain from deceptive actions apart from regulation, 
first-party debt collectors have both a reputation and relationships with 
consumers at stake.122 Additional regulation would be expensive for 
first-party lenders and could even prevent consumers from 
communicating with a lender in a preferred manner.123 
The CFPB may also expand the definition of unfair practices, 
and apply concrete examples of unfair practices found in the FDCPA to 
first-party lenders.124  As with deceptive practices, the FTCA standard  
of unfair practices informs the Dodd-Frank interpretation of the term.125 
A definitional expansion could affect new communication technologies, 
which raises concerns because of the potential consumer costs of 
receiving text messages and calls on cell phones.126 Because of possible 
expenses to consumers, the CFPB is contemplating requiring consumer 
permission for communication through certain forms of media.127 Many 
first-party lenders offer services to consumers that take advantage of 
new  communication technology,  for  example text messaging.128  If the 
 
example, how to avoid disclosure to third parties, while including Mini-Miranda warnings in 
communications via text message or email). 
120. Eliberty Lopez, Debt Collectors Disguised as Facebook “Friends”: Solutions to 
Prevent Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act on Social Media Platforms, 65 
RUTGERS L. REV. 923, 930–31 (2013). 
121. O’Neil et al., supra note 74, at 6. 
122.    Id. at 4–5. 
123. See Comment Letter from Marsha Reeves, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, PayPal, to 
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau 3–4 (Feb. 28, 2014), available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CFPB-2013-0033-0340 (explaining that 
many consumers want to use new technology in their communications, and that allowing 
consumers to limit the media by which they would be contacted would place a burden on 
debt collectors). 
124. Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. at 67873. 
125. Id.; see also BULLETIN, supra note 92, at 1 n.1. 
126. Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. at 67873. 
127. See id. at 67873–74 (requesting comments on whether consumers should be 
required to consent to any communicating from a debt collector if it could result in an 
expense for the consumer, for example text messaging). 
128. See, e.g., Text Banking, BANK OF AM. (Jan. 6, 2014), 
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CFPB imposes regulation on some of those services, it would not only 
create expenses for first-party lenders, it could also inconvenience 
consumers.129 
Upon finalization of the regulation, several additional potential 
regulations intended to prevent unfair practices would apply to third- 
party debt collectors and possibly to first-party lenders.130 The 
regulations are related to payment practices, substantiation, and third- 
party liability.131 The CFPB may clarify payment standards, for  
example, allowing consumers to specify how payments should be 
applied if a consumer owes multiple debts and attempts to pay only one 
of them, and requiring the party to whom the payment is made to issue 
receipts.132 The CFPB has also expressed interest in implementing 
regulations that would require a party collecting a debt to substantiate 
information before making a legal claim on the debt to make sure that 
they have sufficient evidence to move forward in court.133 The CFPB 
may identify what type of substantiation should be required at  what 
stage in the debt collection process,134 and could adopt substantiation 
requirements included in the FTCA, under which some types of 
unsubstantiated claims are unfair and deceptive.135 However, these 
substantiation requirements would be superfluous for first-party 
lenders.136 First-party lenders are the originators of a debt, and it would 
seem pointless to require them to explain the origin of the loans to 
consumers when they have not been sold to another party.137 
 
 
https://www.bankofamerica.com/online-banking/text-banking.go (allowing consumers to 
check their balance or recent transactions by text message). 
129. Comment Letter from William Wallace, Chief Operations Officer, JPMorgan 
Chase & Co., to Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau 3–4 (Feb. 28, 2014), available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CFPB-2013-0033-0304 (explaining that 
immediate communication with consumers is often in the consumers best interest). 
130. See Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. at 67874. 
131. Id. 
132. See id. (questioning whether these additional safeguards may be necessary in light 
of some debt collector practices). 
133. Id. 
134. See id. (requesting information from consumers and industry about what 
information should be substantiated at what stage in litigation or debt collection). 
135. Id. at 67873. The FTCA prohibits the use of “unfair methods of competition in or 
affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” 
Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”) § 5(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. §45(a)(2) (2012). 
136. O’Neil et al., supra note 74, at 5 (discussing information that needs to be included 
in validation notices, which is used to substantiate the accuracy of a debt). 
137. Id. 
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B. Service Providers 
 
Finally, the CFPB may propose two clarifications related to 
service providers.138 First, clarity regarding which  entities  are 
considered service providers, and second, the extent to which a service 
provider’s liability for UDAAP violations extends to a covered party.139 
Dodd-Frank defines service providers as “any person that provides a 
material service to a covered person in connection with the offering or 
provision by such covered person of a consumer financial product or 
service.”140 Covered parties include first-party lenders.141 However, the 
reach of the definition of service providers remains unclear.142 For 
example, is a cell phone carrier a service provider because they provide 
the platform for applications used in credit card or other payment 
transactions for the customers of a first-party lender?143 Under Dodd- 
Frank, covered parties, including first-party lenders, “stand in the shoes 
of their service providers” and may be liable for the misconduct of their 
service providers.144 It is, therefore, crucial that institutions that fall 
under the supervision of the CFPB, like first-party lenders, know which 
service providers they must monitor for compliance to avoid liability for 
UDAAP violations.145 
V. LIMITS ON FIRST-PARTY LENDER REGULATION 
 
The CFPB should extend and clarify regulation for third-party 
debt collectors, but should not regulate first-party lenders in the same 
rulemaking because of distinct differences between first-party lenders 
and  third-party debt  collectors.146     The  suggestion  that  several of the 
 
138. See Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. at 67875. 
139. Id. (requesting information on who the service providers in the industry are and 
what types of services they perform, and what their relationship is to debt collectors). 
140. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) § 
1002(26)(A)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 5481(26)(A)(1) (2012). 
141. Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. at 67852. 
142. VALERIE L. HLETKO & SARAH E. HAGER, BUCKLEY SANDLER LLP, WHICH ONE OF 
US IS THE SERVICE PROVIDER? THE DODD-FRANK ACT’S INFINITE LOOP OF OVERSIGHT 1 
(Aug. 9, 2013), available at http://www.buckleysandler.com/uploads/1082/doc/Emerging- 
Issues_8-13.pdf. 
143. Id. at 3. 
144. Id. at 1. 
145. See id. (discussing the liability of debt collectors for actions of their service 
providers). 
146. See, e.g., Sharp, supra note 39, at 11–12. 
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proposed regulations will be extended to first-party lenders has caused a 
stir in the debt collection industry, since the CFPB seems to ignore the 
“old distinction between third-party collection and the collection  of 
debts   in-house.”147 Some    first-party    lenders  have   specifically 
questioned the CFPB’s statutory authority to regulate third-party debt 
collectors and first-party lenders in the same  way.148  Others  have 
voiced concerns over the practical implications of blanket regulation.149 
 
A. Statutory Limits on the Extension of Regulation—Dodd Frank, 
the FDCPA and the FTCA 
 
In response to the CFPB’s suggestion to extend debt collection 
regulation to first-party lenders,150 some first-party lenders argue that  
the CFPB lacks the authority for such a broad expansion, particularly if 
the CFPB adopts the same regulatory language for first-party lenders as 
already exists for third-party debt collectors under the FDCPA.151 
During the comment period for the ANPR, several first-party lenders 
argued that Congress did not intend for the FDCPA provisions to extend 
to first-party lenders,152 and therefore, the statutory language should not 
indiscriminately apply to both first-party lenders and third-party debt 
collectors.153 
While the FDCPA excludes first-party lenders, the CFPB has 
regulatory   authority   over   first-party   lenders   under Dodd-Frank.154 
 
147. David Kaufman & Joanna M. Zdanys, United States: You Better Watch Out, You 
Better Comply: Regulators Coming To Town (For First-Party Debt Collectors?), MORRISON 
FOERSTER LLP ENFORCEMENT BLOG (Dec. 15, 2014), 
http://www.moforeenforcement.com/2014/12/you-better-watch-out-you-better-comply- 
regulators-coming-to-town-for-first-party-debt- 
collectors/?utm_source=Mondaq&utm_medium=syndication&utm_campaign=View- 
Original. 
148. Sharp, supra note 38, at 11–12. 
149. See, e.g., Nixon, supra note 39, at 2 (suggesting that first-party lenders like banks 
are already heavily regulated and do not require further regulation). 
150. The regulations are mostly related to unfair, abusive, and deceptive practices, and 
modeled in a way that would be uniform with regulation of third-party debt collectors. See, 
e.g., Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. at 67870. 
151. O’Neil et al., supra note 74, at 3, 36–37; see Reeves, supra note 123, at 2; see also 
Wallace, supra note 129, at 2, 4. 
152. See Wallace, supra note 129, at 7. 
153. Id. at 3. 
154. Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) § 
1002(15), 12 U.S.C. § 5481(15) (2012) (describing financial service providers as any party 
that extends credit, which would include first-party lenders). 
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Dodd-Frank was not, however, meant to alter the scope of the 
FDCPA,155 and FDCPA provisions are still limited to only third-party 
debt collectors.156 Dodd-Frank established its own set  of regulations  
and guidance—including on UDAAPs—for financial service 
providers.157 The CFPB must have a reasonable basis before qualifying 
any act or practice as unfair, deceptive, or abusive under Dodd-Frank 
and may not rely solely on public policy considerations.158 The CFPB 
must consult with federal banking agencies in considering the 
“prudential, market, or systemic objectives” of such agencies before 
declaring an act a UDAAP.159 Dodd-Frank tasks the CFPB with 
establishing “general policies” and “implementing the Federal consumer 
financial laws through rules, orders, guidance, interpretations, 
statements of policy, examinations, and enforcement actions.”160 The 
CFPB has interpreted the UDAAP provisions of Dodd-Frank through 
enforcement actions and through reliance on enforcement actions under 
the FTCA,161 as well as the statutory definitions under Dodd-Frank and 
the FTCA.162 It appears now that the CFPB may provide additional 
guidance.163 
The CFPB recently issued a bulletin to clarify UDAAP 
definitions.164 In it, the CFPB provided examples of UDAAPs and 
further defined deceptive practices.165 The examples of UDAAPs 
included in the bulletin as falling within the scope of Dodd-Frank are, 
among others, threatening any legal action that a debt collector is not 
authorized to take, misrepresenting the nature or legal status of a debt,  
or falsely stating that a communication is from an attorney.166 These 
examples seem eerily similar to the prohibitions under the FDCPA.167 
 
155. See O’Neil et al., supra note 74, at 36. 
156. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) § 803(6), 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) 
(2012). 
157.    Dodd-Frank § 1031(a)–(d), 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a)–(d). 
158.    Dodd-Frank § 1031(c)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c)(1). 
159.    Dodd-Frank § 1031(e), 12 U.S.C. § 5531(e). 
160.    Dodd-Frank § 1012(a)(10), 12 U.S.C. § 5492(a)(10). 
161.    See MANUAL, supra note 92, at 1 n.2. 
162.    Id. at 1, 2 n.4. 
163. Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. 67848, 67869–74 (proposed Nov. 12, 
2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1006). 
164. BULLETIN, supra note 92, at 1. 
165. Id. 
166.    Id. at 5–6. 
167. See,  e.g.,  Fair Debt  Collection Practices  Act  (FDCPA) § 807(1)–(5), 15 U.S.C. § 
  
 
 
2015] DEBT COLLECTION REGULATION 337 
The CFPB may interpret Dodd-Frank provisions to mean exactly the 
same thing as the FDCPA provisions and, in so doing, could take 
advantage of the broad authority conferred by Dodd-Frank to implement 
regulations directly at odds with the exclusion of first-party lenders  
from the FDCPA. Dodd-Frank has given the CFPB broad authority to 
interpret statutory provisions,168 however, and there is no valid statutory 
objection to the CFPB defining and interpreting UDAAPs in a manner 
that is consistent with the FDCPA. 
However, UDAAPs have historically been defined through 
enforcement and other agency actions.169 For example, unfair and 
deceptive actions, which are prohibited under the FTCA, were intended 
to be interpreted though individual actions, not specific statutory 
examples, to provide flexibility and prevent the exploitation of 
“loopholes.”170 The term “unfair” was found to be of a “ ‘class of  
phrases which do not admit of precise definition, but the meaning and 
application of which must be arrived at by what this court elsewhere has 
called the gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion.’ ”171 The 
FTCA definitions of unfair and deceptive practices have since been 
defined based on such judicial actions,172 and the CFPB has relied on  
the FTCA interpretations in its enforcement actions to date.173 While 
abusive practices are a new term in consumer protection under Dodd- 
Frank, the CFPB has followed the same practice to define this term: 
filing numerous enforcement actions that continue to provide guidance 
and inform the application of UDAAPs in practice.174 Therefore, while 
the CFPB may have the statutory authority to define and regulate the 
practices  of  first-party  lenders,  it  should  do  so  through enforcement 
 
 
1692e(1)–(5) (2012). 
168. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) § 
1021(c)(1)–(5), 12 U.S.C. § 5511(c)(1)–(5) (2012) (establishing, for example, the CFPB’s 
authority to issue “rules, orders, and guidance implementing Federal consumer financial 
law”). 
169. See Farrell, supra note 48, at 23 (explaining that deceptive and unfair practices 
were shaped by FTC litigation). 
170. International Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1072 (1984). 
171. Id. (quoting Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 648 (1931)) 
(internal quotation omitted). 
172. See id. (“[T]he Commission has continued to refine the standards of unfairness in 
its cases and rules.”). 
173. See Farrell, supra note 48, at 29 (stating that the CFPB relied on the FTCA 
deceptive acts definition). 
174. See id. (listing examples of enforcement actions, like against Capital One in 2012). 
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actions that can address specific circumstances. This approach is better 
suited to first-party lenders because it would take into account their 
unique position and relationship with consumers. 
 
B. Practical Reasons Why Additional Regulation of First-Party 
Lenders is Unnecessary 
 
First-party lenders argue that due to an inherently different 
relationship between themselves and consumers, compared to third- 
party debt collectors, additional regulation remains unnecessary.175 First-
party lenders, such as banks, are already heavily regulated, and limited 
in the ways in which they can interact with consumers by numerous 
other statutes.176 A few examples of additional regulation include the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act, section 5 of the FTCA, the Community 
Reinvestment Act, the Fair Lending Act, the Service Members Civil 
Relief Act, and, of course, Dodd-Frank.177 Many first- party lenders are 
also regulated by state statutes,178 which are often  more stringent than 
federal laws.179 
First-party lenders further argue that the relationship between 
first-party lenders and consumers makes additional regulation 
superfluous.180 First-party lenders rely on strong relationships with 
consumers that create a strategic incentive to maintain those good 
customer relationships and provide fair  treatment.181  Consumers are 
able to choose their first-party lender, thus creating market pressure for 
first-party lenders to attract consumers with a reputation of fair debt 
collection practices.182 Furthermore, once a consumer, like a credit card 
holder, is lost, it costs a first-party lender between $160 and $200 to 
 
175. Wallace, supra note 126, at 4–5. For example, mini-Miranda warnings may scare 
consumers, and make relationship more adversarial. Id. 
176. Nixon, supra note 40, at 2. 
177. Id. 
178. Comment Letter from Bill Himpler, Exec. Vice President, Am. Fin. Serv. Ass’n, to 
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau 6 (Feb. 28, 2014), available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CFPB-2013-0033-0298. 
179. See,  e.g.,  Joel  Stashenko,  State Court Adopts Tighter Rules for  Debt  Collection, 
N.Y. L. J. (Sept. 17, 2014), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202670214756/State- 
Court-Adopts-Tighter-Rules-for-Debt-Collection#ixzz3MeTQbwZm. 
180. Nixon, supra note 40, at 3. 
181. Id. 
182. See Himpler, supra note 178, at 4 (finding that creditors are “still restrained by  
their inherent motivation to protect their goodwill when collecting past due accounts.”). 
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replace that consumer,183 and “a consumer may be debtor today, but 2 
weeks from today he may be a customer again.”184 Thus, first-party 
lenders are highly motivated to treat consumers fairly due to the 
competitive dynamics of the marketplace. 
One requirement that the CFPB takes into consideration for 
regulation of deceptive practices is the mini-Miranda warning, a  
required disclosure statement in a communication that explains that the 
purpose of the communication is to collect a debt.185 The mini-Miranda 
requirement is an essential regulation of third-party debt collectors, who 
generally do not communicate with consumers other than to collect a 
debt and have used unethical means to collect debts.186 First-party 
lenders are concerned that forcing consumers to listen to such a standard 
warning would frustrate the first-party lender relationship, since first- 
party lenders communicate with consumers for a variety of reasons.187 
Furthermore, according to some first-party lenders, requiring standard 
warnings or disclosures of information when first-party lenders 
communicate about a debt could create a “hostile and adversarial 
environment,” thus closing off communication between creditors and 
consumers and foreclosing opportunities for early resolution of debt 
issues.188 The application of the mini-Miranda warning could become 
cumbersome and counterproductive under such circumstances. 
 
183. Id. at 5 (quoting Julie Austin & Vytas Kisielius, Confronting the Rise of First Time 
Debtors: How to Collect Delinquencies from Otherwise Good Customers with Focus on 
Long-Term Relationships, TSYS (Summer 2010), available at 
http://www.tsys.com/thoughtLeadership/ngenuityInAction/summer2010/). 
184. Id. at 4 (quotation marks omitted). 
185. See Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. 67848, 67864, 67872–73 
(proposed Nov. 12, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1006). An example of a standard 
mini-Miranda warning is “this communication is an attempt to collect a debt and any 
information obtained will be used for that purpose.” Federal and State Mini-Miranda 
Disclosure Fastfax #1145, ACA INT’L (Jul. 15, 2013), 
http://www.acainternational.org/fastfaxdoc-federal-and-state-mini-miranda-disclosure- 
fastfax-1145-20345.aspx. 
186. Tim Henderson, Comment, No Country for Voicemails: How the CFPB Can 
Resolve a Paradox and Protect America’s Consumers from the World’s Fourth Oldest 
Profession, 92 N.C. L. REV. 626, 654 n.161 (Jan. 2014) (citing Robert J. Hobbs, National 
Consumer Law Center, Fair Debt Collection 291 (7th ed. 2011)) (including an example of 
fake sweepstakes sent to consumers). 
187. O’Neil et al., supra note 74, at 25–26 (explaining that consumers might get 
frustrated with repeatedly listening to standard warnings in communications with first-party 
lenders). 
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First-party lenders are also concerned with the effects that 
additional regulation could have on their bottom line.189 Changing 
procedures adds additional expenses, and Dodd-Frank specifically 
requires the CFPB to take industry cost into account when formulating 
new rules, including a “sound cost-benefit analysis.”190 First-party 
lenders believe that more regulations could create a “disincentive for 
some consumers to repay their obligations,”191 which in turn could 
increase the cost of consumer loans.192  More regulation may also lead  
to more debts being sold, since collection becomes more difficult,193 or 
be so detrimental to consumers’ relationships with first-party lenders 
that those lenders lose the incentive to build a positive relationship.194 
While no evidence exists that new debt collection regulations 
would restrict the availability of credit, or that it would increase the 
costs to consumers,195 other concerns may be more valid. Recently, 
Wells Fargo announced that it would sell around $8.5 billion in federal 
student loans to Navient,196 a loan servicer recently spun off from Sallie 
Mae.197 This announcement came only weeks after the CFPB report on 
abusive conduct in student debt collection that included allegations 
against Sallie Mae and Navient, for “allocating borrowers’ 
underpayments across multiple loans in a manner that maximizes late 
fees; and [m]isrepresenting and inadequately disclosing in its billing 
statements how borrowers could avoid late fees.”198 
 
189. See Himpler, supra note 173, at 7 (expressing concern about “burdensome” 
regulation). 
190. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) § 
1016b(a)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 5496b(a)(1) (2012). 
191. Comment Letter from Tom Wolfe, Exec. Vice President, Consumer Credit 
Solutions, Wells Fargo Bank, to Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau 1 (Feb. 28, 2014), available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CFPB-2013-0033-0268. 
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195. Ripley, supra note 84, at 4–5 (finding no harmful impact on consumers after 
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Consumers may have additional reasons to be concerned about 
the sale of their loans.   In May 2014, Navient and Sallie Mae reached a 
$97 million settlement with the federal government related to  
allegations of unfair debt collection practices, including that they 
“maximized late fees and failed to adequately disclose how consumers 
could avoid the fees.”199 From October 2013 to September 2014, 
consumers filed almost 2,000 complaints against Navient and Sallie 
Mae.200 The sale of student loans demonstrates that  increased  
regulatory scrutiny can cause first-party lenders to abdicate debt 
collection to third-party debt collectors or other loan buyers, but it also 
undermines the argument that first-party lenders are committed to their 
consumers and want to maintain positive consumer relationships.201 
 
C. More Appropriate Measures of Regulation 
 
While several practical reasons exist for why first-party lenders 
should not be regulated in the same manner as third-party debt 
collectors, there are clear concerns over the debt collection practices of 
many first-party lenders.202 As the CFPB points out, there is lingering 
concern that consumers who are unable to pay their bills are not the  
kind of customer with whom a first-party lender would want to 
“maintain a long-term business relationship”203 that would negate any 
incentive to treat consumers fairly. First-party lenders point out that  
their debt collection  practices are focused  on  consumer   relationships, 
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and include “polite notes” and reminder phone calls from bank 
employees who personally know the consumer.204 According to first- 
party lenders, employees check to see if there may be “something in the 
customer’s situation that has changed which may justify consideration  
of an adjustment on the borrower’s repayment schedule.”205 
In light of the number of consumer complaints,206 this 
description rings hollow. While there are certainly more incentives for 
first-party lenders to maintain a relationship with returning consumers, 
debt collection is not always what it should be.207 Particularly with the 
advent of new technology, there are several methods of debt collection, 
such as collection efforts through social media that will require new 
regulation for both third-party debt collectors and first-party lenders.208 
Further, even though all FDCPA provisions should not be 
indiscriminately extended and applied to first-party lenders, any conduct 
that violates the UDAAP provisions of Dodd-Frank should be addressed 
by the CFPB or other regulatory agencies, as in the cases of DriveTime 
or Freedom Stores.209 In addressing these consumer concerns, however, 
the CFPB should continue to utilize enforcement actions to define 
UDAAP provisions, instead of relying on overbroad industry regulation. 
While individual actions may delay a concise UDAAP definition, it is 
more adaptable to individual circumstances. And if the CFPB does, 
ultimately, choose to establish more concrete regulations for first-party 
lenders, it should do so in a separate rulemaking that addresses first- 
party lenders’ unique position and concerns. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The CFPB has a long road ahead before it can issue a final 
rule.210 It has taken an important  step towards regulating third-party  
debt collectors and changing the perception of the debt collection 
industry.211    In doing so, however, the CFPB has neglected to properly 
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distinguish between first-party lenders and third-party debt collectors.212 
Even though debt collection statutes recognize the need to treat the two 
sectors of the industry differently,213 the CFPB seems intent on creating 
a blanket rule for UDAAP provisions that would treat first-party lenders 
and third-party debt collectors the same. The CFPB may have the 
authority to do just that under Dodd-Frank,214 but it may not be wise to 
do so. Approaching regulation of first-party lenders through 
enforcement actions, as it has done in the past, may be a better solution 
to addressing valid consumer concerns regarding first-party debt 
collection practices. By doing so, the CFPB would be able  to address 
the practical concerns that first-party lenders have raised in a flexible 
manner. Overall, while the CFPB is to be commended for its efforts to 
provide more consumer protection while taking industry concerns into 
consideration, it must ensure that it does so discriminately. 
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